President Bill Clinton, in attempting to define the origins of terrorism articulated, “The forces of terror and extremism... feed on disillusionment, on poverty, on despair.” The way to end terrorism, in his judgment, is to “spread prosperity and security to all.”
Later politicians, in their counter-terrorism campaigns, have upheld this idea that poverty is one of the main factors that contributes to the development of terrorist organizations and the main motivations for individual members to decide to join. When the Taliban gained territorial goals in the Swat Valley region of Pakistan, the Obama administration reacted by sending aid packages to the region, reinforcing this concept. But does this understanding have any root in reality, or is it but a misconception of the foundations of terrorism?
At its surface, the theory seems to collapse onto itself; take 9/11 for example, the basis for the foundational understanding of contemporary terrorism for the vast majority of the American public. The nineteen individuals that conducted the 9/11 attacks were well-educated men from economically well-off families that had a plethora of opportunities. Let’s take Hamas, PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad), Hezbollah and the Israeli Jewish settlers that attacked Palestinians in the West Bank in the 1980s; participation in these groups was generally associated with higher living standards and education than the general public of that region.
Some claim that the poverty argument should not be taken this literally, but rather it's in the ‘enabling environment’ that poverty plays a role. In other words, while the terrorists themselves may not be impoverished, the environment or society around them that offers support structures of the terrorist groups, suffer from dire socioeconomic conditions. By this logic, it would then have to follow that the most impoverished of nations would provide the most fertile context for the development of terrorist cells, but this too falls flat. "In the forty-nine countries currently designated by the United Nations as the least developed, hardly any terrorist activity occurs." In fact, it is in societies of medium and high human development that a majority of terrorist cells are formed and partake in.
What is known as the ‘Social Identity Perspective’ provides the most cohesive and complete understanding of the factors that lead to terrorism. The argument essentially takes elements from all others. An individual’s decision to join a terrorist group and engage in terrorism, whether national, interstate or global, derives from the mixture of facts: the propensity for violence, grievances, whether real or perceived, against a common enemy, certain life experiences or histories, personal conditions and precipitating events.
But this argument too does not seem complete, if two people had identical circumstances and rationalities, one may turn to terrorism and the other may not. It is true that this argument also falls short of creating a predominant causal model for the propensity towards very specific terrorism.
“It’s hard to generalize about terrorist groups. On one extreme are individuals who have no recognized links to a terrorist organization — so-called lone wolves. On the other end of the spectrum are highly organized groups that persist over time, have a well-defined chain of command and a stable leadership. In between are loosely connected small groups as well as shadowy networks — for example, Neo-Nazis or radical Islamists. All of these disparate entities are typically in a state of flux. Change is constant; stability rare.”
In comparison, this explanation seems to come the closest. While poverty, psychology, rationality, and culture when taken independently do not provide an argument that is quite up to par in defining what it is that leads a person to become a terrorist, they contribute to a fuller understanding. It involves a combination of political, religious, socioeconomic factors when paired with specific psychologies and propensities towards violence, grievances, and a sense of purpose that derives from being a part of a group.
These factors trigger events followed by a rational progression towards violence and the occurrence of groups derived from isolation once the individual is a part of the group. This comes closer to defining the unique circumstances under which an individual makes the decision to engage in acts of terrorism. While the 'Social Identity Perspective' explanation does not seem completely satisfactory, it presents a better understanding than the individual factors could have.
