Humanistic psychologists and positive psychologists draw from distinct philosophical and epistemological wells. However, their research interests and their areas of expertise are decidedly similar.
Alan Waterman (2013) provides a comprehensive summary of what he terms the “humanistic-psychology positive-psychology divide.” He cites three major categories of conflict between the fields: 1) an ontological component, particularly concerning approaches to human nature and development; 2) an epistemological component, with respect to their varied approaches to psychological research; and 3) a philosophical component regarding practical applications of clinical techniques. He argues that these contrasts are irreconcilable and that each field should, therefore “pursue separately” their respective goals.
Waterman’s distinctions might best be conceptualized via analogy: consider the Greek philosophers Socrates and Aristotle. Socratic thought predated and influenced Aristotelian thought in a manner comparable to the way in which humanistic psychology predated and influenced positive psychology.
Socrates emphasized the virtues of freedom and introspection, and he repeatedly challenged the sociopolitical and intellectual authorities of his day to think unconventionally. Because of its grounding in existential philosophy, humanistic psychology has always maintained similar emphases on the truth of free will and the primacy of subjective experience.
Moreover, given the dominance of behavioral theorists in the mid-20th century, humanistic psychology emerged in a context where it was forced to dispute popular psychological thought in the same manner that Socrates grappled with traditional authority. But where Socrates touted the “open forum,” Aristotle promoted more logical, formalized thought systems.
Positive psychology’s nomothetic approach to research parallels Aristotle’s preference for tangible, empirical truth. Positive psychologists and Aristotelian thinkers have also enjoyed a higher degree of “mainstream” acceptance than have humanistic psychologists and Socratic thinkers.
There exists a salient literary and philosophical relationship between Aristotle and Socrates. Imagine what could have been lost if only one and not the other’s ideas had risen to prominence in classical Greece; imagine what would have been lost if one group of disciples came to dominate the other – if Aristotelian thinkers attempted to “merge” the two schools of thought, for example, how could they resist the urge to reduce Socrates’ relentless questioning to some lesser form of critical thinking that would not challenge their prized empiricism?
There is no scenario where a hybrid school of thought does not in some way water down the principles of one or both of the originals. The same is true of positive and humanistic psychology. Each must exist separately, or else not truly exist at all.
The above coincides with Waterman’s conclusions, both before and after his response to critics. But he fails to fully appreciate the importance – the necessity – of fostering productive working relations between humanistic and positive psychologists. Friedman (2014) writes that Waterman “confounds difficulties with impossibilities” with respect to their possible reconciliation. Friedman goes on to advocate for a total integration of the two disciplines than I can support, but he is correct in that juxtaposed approaches, be they philosophical, epistemological, or otherwise, are not inherently incompatible.
In fact, the exact opposite is true. When they share a common goal, diverse theoretical approaches to psychological problems yield higher quality research and results than singular approaches.
Consider the preeminence of the “eclectic” approach to contemporary clinical practice. Eclectic practitioners – that is, therapists who draw from cognitive, behavioral, psychoanalytic, and other theoretical perspectives – outnumber practitioners who subscribe to any particular model (Pomerantz, 2017). This is the case because, by acknowledging the validity of contributions from varied perspectives, clinicians recognized that they could increase the efficacy and the effectiveness of their treatments.
If theorists had instead “talked past” one another, as modern humanistic and positive psychologists largely do, those advances would not have been made, and clients would be the worse for it. This development exemplifies the importance of interdisciplinary communication and the fact that a lack thereof can be not only inefficient but also irresponsible.
Positive psychology and humanistic psychology share a focus on the non-maladaptive aspects of mental health. I believe that their respective identities should remain distinct and that professional dialogue between related fields, in general, stands to benefit all involved.
Therefore, humanistic and positive psychologists should understand themselves as distinguishable from one another but should communicate in an academic context as much as possible. Both fields’ research scopes, knowledge bases, and overall relevance will increase as a result.
