Cultural Relativism, a theory concerning ethical principles, was first proposed in 1887 in an attempt to explain moral behavior. The theory proposes a few claims, emphasizing that different societies have different moral codes, and the moral codes of a society determine what is right within that society; that is, if the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action is right, at least within that society, which would imply that there is no objective standard that can be used to judge one society’s code as better than others, ultimately saying that there is no “universal truth” in ethics.
Basically, the main argument that Cultural Relativism brings up is that different cultures have different ethical beliefs; therefore moral claims are reports of cultural features. The argument is self-explanatory; since every culture supposedly has different ethical values that would, therefore, mean that moral claims are solely based on what a particular society claims them to be relative to that society.
Another related argument that comes with the theory of Cultural Relativism is what is known as the Argument from Origins, which maintains the same conclusion as the previous argument. This argument proposes that we obtain our ethical beliefs via enculturation (the process by which one comes to identify oneself with their culture); therefore ethical claims are reports of cultural features. What this argument says is that since we all grow up influenced mostly by a specific culture, we are then practically indoctrinated with the moral values by which that specific culture abides.
This theory, like most philosophical theories, has not been able to avoid any form of criticisms. However, unlike a lot of theories, Cultural Relativism has been denied thoroughly by bringing up multiple concerns. One of these concerns, perhaps the most basic, is in the argumentation of the theorem. The argument that the theory presents is, in effect, not sound. A sound argument would be one such that the premises of the argument are true and also the information in the conclusion is contained in the premises; in other words, the argument is also valid.
By analyzing the argument proposed by Cultural Relativism, one can see that the premise (the first part) of the argument concerns what people believe, whereas the conclusion concerns what really is the case, which does not follow logically from this sort of a premise. Also, much like with the belief that some people hold that the earth is not round, there is no reason to think that if there is moral truth, that everyone must know it. Lastly, the main mistake that Cultural Relativism makes is the attempt at deriving a substantive conclusion about a topic from the mere fact that people disagree with it, which logically will never work out, no matter the argument.
This concern, however, is by far not the last of them. I will tackle three other refutes to Cultural Relativism, based on the consequences that come with taking this theory seriously. First, if Cultural Relativism were to be the fundamental theory of the acquisition of moral values, we could no longer say that the customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own. Since moral values, according to the theory, are relative to one’s culture that would mean that, for example, the activities performed during the Holocaust would have to be considered a “right” moral action since that is what Nazi Germany considered to be morally right. We would have to cease condemning other societies merely because their moral values are “different.”
Second, if Cultural Relativism were true, we could decide whether our actions are right or wrong just by consulting the standards of our society. This would imply that if one wanted to determine whether or not an action is considered right or wrong, they could simply turn to the moral values that their particular cultures holds in order to find their answer. This also, then, not only forbids us from criticizing the moral codes of other societies, it also forbids us from criticizing the moral codes of our own society.
Last, in accordance to Cultural Relativism, the idea of moral progress is called into doubt, no matter the culture. For example, one would not be able to say that Germany has made substantial moral progress from their time of being ruled by a totalitarian, extremely fascist government to the much more democratic government that it currently has. If the old ways of a society were in accordance with the social standards of their time, then Cultural Relativism would say it is a mistake to judge them by the standards of another era. So, as said previously, a particular society is in no way, according to the theory, capable of progressing morally, which is obviously false.
Disregarding the evident falsehood of Cultural Relativism, it is not to say that all cultures share some common moral values. Even though the theory presented can definitely be refuted, and most of the time is by scholars, it is a mistake to overestimate the amount of difference between the moral values of cultures. Cultures may differ in what they regard as legitimate exceptions to the moral rules held by that specific culture, but this disagreement exists against an extensive background of agreement.
It is indubitably wrong in saying that every moral value sustained by a certain culture is relative to that culture because there are some moral rules that all societies must have in common. Those specific rules are required in order for society to exist and stay in existence. For example, if the nurturing of infants was not held by every society, then not every society would be able to prosper, and thus would lead to the extinction of the societies who do not abide by those fundamental moral rules.
