Some argue that the nature of terrorism took a sharp turn in the late 1990s, and with the Islamic revolution in Iran and the anti-Soviet multinational mujahidin campaign in Afghanistan. This new terrorism is said to consist of groups with explicitly and independently religious motivations, along with an inclination for mass casualty terrorism through new technologies and capabilities, and an ability to adapt due to a networked organization with little or no hierarchical structure.

This shift from ethnic to religious terrorism, also known as the ‘second wave’ is believed to have fundamentally changed the nature of terrorism. The National Liberation Front (FLN) and al-Qaeda can be used as proxies of exemplars of ethnic terrorism and religious terrorism respectively. Many claim that the motives, tactics and organizational structures of religious versus ethnic and other forms of terrorism have fundamentally changed and therefore terrorism itself. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the nature of contemporary religious terrorism is anything new or vastly divergent from historical trends besides what can be accounted for as a reflection of technological advances, capabilities, and globalization.

Defining characteristics of new terrorism proposed by scholars and practitioners include networked, not hierarchical; politico-religious, not secular; transnational, not territorial; mass casualty, not restrained; and destruction, not political goals. Given this definition for the basis on which this fundamental change of terrorism as perceived to exist upon, these identifying characteristics must be applied to both ethnic, or ‘traditional’ terrorism, and religious, or ‘new’ terrorism. Ethnic terrorism, the form of which mainly rose from efforts at independence and decolonization, is generally understood. Taking Algeria as the primary example of ethnic terrorism; the FLN maintained a rational and potentially negotiable political goal, the creation of a sovereign Algeria from French colonization. In this sense, the ‘old terrorism’ is considered primarily secular, in its orientation and inspiration.

The FLN’s terrorism, as defined under ‘traditional’ terrorism would be viewed as discriminate. The FLN targeted French Algerians, cafes and bars that the French Algerians frequented and Muslims that they viewed as traitorous. The FLN also had an obvious hierarchical organization with a leader, in this case, Djafar. Underneath is a large layer of active terrorists who carried out the attacks and often specialized in certain activities such as bomb-making, assassinations or surveillance, such as Ali La Pointe. At the next level would be the active supporters, who supply intelligence, weapons, supplies, communication, transportation and safe houses. At the bottom are the passive supporters, who agree with the goals of the terrorist organization and spread their ideas and express their emotional support, which in this case was generally speaking the broader Algerian population.

The FLN essentially fits into the definitional characteristics of ‘traditional’ terrorism, but does al-Qaeda fit those of ‘new’ terrorism? While al-Qaeda is undoubtedly a religion-based group, the assertion that it does not have political objectives and goals is absurd. They still have specific political agendas, such as the overthrow of the existing governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the elimination of Israel. On the other hand, many old terrorist organizations had close links with and were at least partly motivated by religion including the FLN in Algeria. It can be difficult to differentiate religious and political motivations.

Not only would al-Qaeda not fit into this definition of religious, not secular, and destruction, not political goals, the motivation itself is not characteristic of anything ‘new’; rather early examples of terrorism, such as the Sicariis, had both religious and political motivations. They stabbed their target with a ‘sica’ or small knife in the name of God, but like al-Qaeda, they had more immediate political goals. Likewise, the Assassins were also a religious terrorist group based on the Ismaili branch of Shi’ite Islam. Their goal was to spread their form of Islam throughout the Middle East and defeat Sunni rulers.

Terrorism in the name of religion cannot be defined as ‘new’ in any sense of the word. The third point is mass casualty versus restrained attacks, the argument being that ‘new’ religious terrorists use excessive force. This in itself is a hard point to prove, as discrimination is open to interpretation. We might consider the attacks on 9/11 as indiscriminate, while they might consider it measured attacks on the centers of US economic and security centers. In addition, the FLN killed innocent French civilians, who were symbolic targets just as American civilians were for Al-Qaeda, so the issue doesn’t seem to be who is being targeted but rather how many are killed. It is true that the September 11 attacks surpassed all other terrorist attacks in terms of the number of casualties. But this increase in casualties can be more readily accounted for by better technology, as opposed to some inherent shift in the nature of terrorism.

Organizationally al-Qaeda is not necessarily an anomaly. Loosely networked, unconnected cells of like-minded radicals are not a uniquely new characteristic for terrorist groups. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was considered an ‘umbrella group’ where the central group known as the Fatah did not necessarily have any control or power over those that proclaimed allegiance to it. Likewise, the organizational structure of Hezbollah also does not seem to follow any strict lines of control. The anarchist movement in Russia and the wider European region that was held responsible for various attacks against heads of states had no hierarchical structure, but rather was just a group of unconnected individuals with common ideologies.

Most, if not all, of the characteristics many scholars hypothesize, are the characteristics of a new and fundamentally different form of terrorism, are simply not anything new, in terms of motives, tactics, and organizations. These ‘new’ terrorists, including al-Qaeda, simply aren’t doing anything to earn the name ‘new’. Most motivations, tactics and organizational structures can be found in what is defined as ‘traditional’ groups. The substantial shifts and changes that do exist can be accounted for in the most part by technological advances and globalization. But such shifts do not constitute a great enough change to support the argument that contemporary terrorism is something fundamentally dissimilar to terrorist organizations that have existed throughout history.