The effort to seek a knowledge and understanding of the past forms a central element of the purpose and function of the historical discipline. It is because of its importance that it is crucial that historians approach this effort in the best manner possible. The qualities of the intellectual methods which historians employ in considering historical matters have a necessary effect on the quality of their conceptions of history, and upon the historical knowledge and understandings produced. The epistemological ideas which a historical thinker adheres to (that is, their philosophical ideas about the nature of knowledge, thinking, and how knowledge it is attained) hold an especially vital place. That is why I am addressing the matter of empiricism; so as to make the case that empiricism is a misguided notion, and that using it in history is counterproductive toward the effort of seeking historical knowledge and understanding.
Empiricism is the notion that knowledge comes entirely or primarily from sense experience, and on that basis that sense experience is its means and sanction. This theory is popular among many people, especially in the material sciences. There are plenty of people who uncritically believe in its validity. There are likewise a fair share of historians, who, whether by conviction or social osmosis, believe in empiricism.
I, as a realist rationalist (one who adheres to the notion that knowledge is derived through the rational intellect forming conceptions consistent with an independent reality), and a historian, will contend against empiricism and against its application to historical consideration.
Firstly, Empiricism in general is an invalid and unjustified theory of knowledge. Empiricism cannot justify itself. How does one know that sense experience can be reliable to inform oneself? The sense experience itself does not contain within it an evident justification to regard it. To justify a belief in sense experience it must be validated by something outside of it. Thus, in order to believe in sense experience, we must admit to a source of knowledge outside of it, which would render pure empiricism false. If empiricism refuses to admit to an outside of knowledge, then it condemns itself to being without a certain justification.
David Hume, one of history’s most prominent philosophers in support of empiricism, recognized this issue in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. That sensory experience does inherently evoke a belief in it. Hume skated around this by claiming this belief was a convention of thinking. He either did not see or did not admit that this issue is a death nail for empiricism. One must either justify understanding from sense experience and declare pure empiricism false or save empiricism and declare the belief in both it and sense experience is not backed by justification. Either way it renders the notion of pure empiricism absurd.
Then there is the type of empiricism which admits to some non-sensory knowledge, but claims knowledge to be primarily derived from sense experience. This type of empiricism often tries to justify itself by making claims, such as that sense experience sets off the chain of thinking, or that most knowledge is about sensory matters, or that empirical data is an arbiter of theories.
I would counter this notion with a number of points.
The line of thinking or of discerning knowledge does not start with the senses. The line of thinking starts with the intellect of the mind. The consideration of a matter starts with the mental awareness of the prospective object of thought, and then proceeds into the work of mentally undergoing thought on the object. The sense experience is nothing more a stimulant until the mind endeavors to look at it and to wonder if it has use in considering.
Most knowledge is not about sensory matters. While knowledge is often about objects which have a physical presence and consequently can induce sense perceptions, the claim most knowledge would be about sensory matters does not follow. There are many matters of knowledge which are not about material objects. Even among those objects with sensory components, none of them are strictly sensory. Every one of them involves consideration of non-sensory matters, the understanding of which constitute a significant part of understanding the object of consideration.
Sensory information is not an arbiter of notions. While sensory information can be used to help inform about the possible feasibility of ideas, it does not from its mere presence present a clear interpretive directive. Data can be interpreted in a variety of ways, employing different non-sensory considerations, whose qualities affect the understanding of how sensory information is to be taken. Furthermore, sensory information cannot be taken at face value. Picture an image of a cheeseburger. But the image not of an actual cheeseburger; it’s a cleverly designed artistic rendering which by all outside appearance looks like one. Your sensory input would indicate to you that this is a cheeseburger, but intellectual consideration and investigation will tell you it’s not. Did the senses tell you this distinction? No. Your intellect considered various sensory and non-sensory information, and used reason and imagination to consider possibilities, and rendered a decision on what was the case.
Empiricism is a flawed notion. Your sense experiences do not produce knowledge. They provide data which can inform consideration. Though there is also non-sensory data, imagination, and reason, are also vital elements. The means of knowledge comes not from the senses, but from the intellect. The mind uses sensory and non-sensory date, reason, and imagination to conceive of ideas and then to consider over them to discern their validity. The intellect is the means of knowledge. Though it does not arrive so merely on its own. In order for it to produce knowledge of an object of consideration, the ideas of it, which it produces, must be consistent with the truth of the matter.
The other half of this paper will be continued in the following article.
