Etymologically, “metaphysics” is not a very difficult word. Meta- means with or after; Physis is the study of the motions and behavior of matter (nature). So then metaphysics means (at its most literal) “after (or with) the study of the motions and behavior of matter.” But the question that is most undoubtedly asked is this: what comes after the study of the motions and behavior of matter?” The answer: the nature of the things themselves. According to Aristotle, the study of metaphysics is the study of causes and principles of substance, or being qua being. But with a definition, there arises more questions: what, indeed, are “causes”? What indeed are “principles”? And furthermore, what is “nature” and what is “substance”? To understand this definition, we must engage some of these words head on with Aristotle in his book, The Metaphysics. Hopefully, once these definitions are cleared up, his overall schema for his book and philosophy will become clearer for the unexperienced reader.

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The Metaphysics, first and foremost, should be seen as a shift in the ancient philosophical conversation from an investigation of material cause to an investigation of final cause.[1] Before Aristotle (as he relays in Book α)[2], the philosophers had always been attempting to understand the constitutive “being” of reality- that is, the material cause of different substances (at least, according to Aristotle). Aristotle speaks briefly about those who thought that this was summed up in one element or the other- whether fire, water, air, etc,- or in the stoic monism of eternal mathematic concepts. The latter were closer to asking about the teleological end of matter, but this revolution does not happen fully until one gets to Plato and his Theory of Forms. However, even Plato did not have a proper understanding of the proper dialectical tools evident from the world around us- his insistence that there are external, intrinsic forms is, in fact, problematic. Forms could not be the cause of change and growth and eventual teleological fulfillment, because Plato did not articulate how particulars could actually subsist in these eternal, unchangeable, external realities.[3] Furthermore, he did not understand that he was really looking for something more precise than being; and to this new sharpening or focusing of the task of philosophy, Aristotle innovates the term “substance.”[4]

The examination, therefore, that follows in Aristotle’s masterwork revolves around this question: what is the meaning of substance? The first place one should look for an answer is in chapter δ, where we will find a brief description of relevant terms, such as nature, principle, and cause. And, for that matter, even a definition of substance (though this will be expanded in the famous ζ and η sections of his works) makes a preliminary appearance. This, then, is a good place to begin our search for a definition of terms (and, to that end, a clearer definition of metaphysics).

In chapter δ,[5] Aristotle begins with defining what it means to be a principle. And to that end, he outlines six complimentary definitions, and then posits their commonality for ease of digestion.

The first definition of “principle” is “that in something from which a process might first arrive.” Aristotle adds to this point that one finds a good example in geometry, when one considers a line. Every line has two distinct points from which it begins, point a and point b. Another example would be a road, because it has a distinct beginning, either on one end of it or another.

The second definition of “principle” is “that from which everything might best be produced.” This is the case in knowledge, which one has a definite “starting point” from which he begins learning about the topic at hand. The important thing to consider, however, is that this may not be the traditional “beginning” of the subject, but rather where progress in knowledge of it is best made by one who is beginning to test the temperatures of the water.

A third definition is that principles are “the intrinsic part from which something is produced.” A good example of this is the foundations of a house: you begin with the foundations, the starting point, and from there the whole structure comes into being. Aristotle also includes an animal’s brain or soul in this definition.

Definition four compliments the third definition: however, rather than saying that principles are “intrinsic” parts, he concludes that they can also be “non-intrinsic” parts from which a process of change originates. This would include natural things, such as a child coming from his mother and father.

The fifth definition is “that by whose choice processes or changes are initiated.” Aristotle gives both political and artistic examples to clarify his meaning concerning this definition: for example, a monarch or king would be a principle by whose choice political processes or changes would be initiated. Furthermore, an architect would be a principle by whose choice architectural process and changes would be initiated.

And finally, a principle should also be thought about as “that by which a thing is primarily cognizable,” that is, the supposition with which one approaches all demonstrations.

However, because these definitions are long and possibly even unhelpful when considering metaphysics, Aristotle tells us what is common about these things: “The common feature,” he says, “of all principles/starts is to be the primary origin (of being, production, or cognition).” Therefore, when we say that metaphysics is “the study of causes and principles of substance,” one can say that metaphysics is partially the study of “the primary origin of being, production, or cognition.” However, this is not a complete definition, and more digging will naturally be required.

The second definition we must seek out is the definition of cause, which Aristotle continues with on page 115. There are less definitions for this word: there are only four, as far as our philosopher is here concerned. They are as follows:

• An intrinsic feature from which something is produced.
• The form and template; what a thing is to be.
• The source of the primary principle of change or stasis.
• The end of something.

This today, of course, is known as “Aristotle’s Four Causes.”[6] These four causes are usually termed thusly: The Material Cause, The Formal Cause, the Efficient Cause, and the Final Cause. These correspond with the order above. However, for Aristotle, this metaphysics is concerned with the understanding of the these causes as they relate to substance: the material, or intrinsic feature(s), of substance; the form and template of substance; the source, or efficient cause, of substances; and, above all, the end, or final cause, of the substance at hand. And so, for Aristotle, all of these things, plus “the primary origin” substance, should be considered when one thinks about what a substance is.

The final term we must consider prior to moving our attention to Aristotle’s treatment of substance is “nature.” And for this word, Aristotle lists six definitions:

• The production of things growing.
• The intrinsic component of something growing from which its growth primarily proceeds.
• The intrinsic source of the primary process for each growing thing, just qua the growing thing that it is.
• The primary material from which some one of the things having natural being is either compounded or produced.
• The Substance of things with natural being.
• All substances.

Here, then, we gain a view into what Aristotle is going to mean by substance, what is the actual work of his The Metaphysics. The Metaphysics’s whole program is to investigate being qua being, that is, what things actually are, in the terms of essence (or “nature”) and substance. This is why, in this area of book δ, Aristotle makes these terms synonymous. The nature of “nature” is “substance,” which provides the categorical link for Aristotle to make the theoretical jump towards philosophical precision: substance is, by definition, something’s essence.

This theme is picked up again in book ζ,[7] where Aristotle begins to puzzle over what it means to be a substance. He offers up four possibilities, and they are discussed throughout the rest of the book. The four possibilities are as follows:

• The subject of the properties.
• The essence of a thing.
• The universal it falls under.
• The genus to which it belongs.

First, Aristotle writes off his first suggestion. A substance cannot be a subject of properties, that is, a thing which is not predicated itself and is the predication of other things, because this is too vague. Furthermore, substance cannot simply be defined as a matter, or a composite in matter: for a composite lacks “thisness.” However, it is important to note that Aristotle does not dismiss the idea that a substance could be a form.

Aristotle then turns to a discussion of what he actually believes the answer to be: substances are best defined as essences of things. Aristotle defines an essence as what is included in a per se account of you. However, he is not satisfied with this definition. He goes on to postulate that essences must be those per se things that are mentioned in your definition. This leads to a thrilling discussion of definitions, in which it is concluded that definitions cannot be made of compound things (which means natures cannot be compound, but must be categorically one). And this leads Aristotle to conclude, in book 4, that substances are primarily species, because species are categorically one and do not contain anything but essences.

This, of course, is revolutionary! Aristotle has seemingly solved the problem of Plato’s Forms. Because now, form (which is wherein your substance is) is not external, or transcendent- rather it is immanent. It is something inside you. Your substance, the stuff that makes you “you,” is in your nature.[8]

This connection is further reinforced in book 6, where Aristotle compares his criterion of substance with his criterion of essence, and sees that his category of species matches both definitions completely. Therefore, a species must be primarily what one equates with “nature” or “essence.”

From here, he returns to his discussion of Aristotle’s first suggestion and examines what this means in terms of form and matter. What is concluded he states thusly: “the key point is that the substance is the form dwelling in the object and that from it the substance that is a composite of the form and of the matter’s said to be a substance.” Though this brings up other questions, such as how this can then be presented as unity if a substance is both a genus and a differentia, Aristotle is quick to point out the difference between the thingness of the genus and the non-thingness of the differentia. The rest of the book is spent criticizing Plato’s theory of forms accordingly.

We should, from here, move on to a discussion of Book η.[9] In this book, Aristotle decides to completely redo his approach to substance. Here, rather, he would like to frame the discussion in terms of matter and form, of potentiality and actuality.[10] All of creation, Aristotle would contend, is a composite of form and matter. Matter is always in a state of change, of growth- really, of actuality. The form, however, now no longer external to the substance, gives this matter potential to become something, a teleological goal by which the matter is shaped and has structure imposed on it. This composite of form and matter, as far as Aristotle is concerned in book η, is what is to be meant when talking about substance.

The discussion is taken up again in book λ,[11] after we learn of the superiority of actuality over potentiality, form over matter, and of species over particular in book θ, read of a lengthy criticism (and clarifications) of the concept of unity in book ι, and experience and equally lengthy recapitulation of problems already encountered in book κ. In this book, λ, Aristotle begins to expound on his theology. And this is quite interesting, because, for Aristotle (as for Plato [and, perhaps all of us]), his theology is grounded in his metaphysics. Therefore, I will consider this book a little more carefully, because it is so fundamental to Aristotle’s understanding of the essence and goal of First Philosophy.

Aristotle begins by elaborating once again on what he means by substance. And here, he puts forth two types of substances: sensible and unmoved substances. The sensible substances are either eternal (1) or destructible. And these are constituted in the study of nature. However, there is also a third kind of substance, the unmoved substance. And this, for Aristotle, is the study of final cause: Teleological Substance, one might say.

This concept of final cause is of the utmost important for how Aristotle understands substance. Substance, he postulates, is the goal of matter, because, as we have seen, substance is wherein the form dwells in all its potentiality. Asking what it is is not enough for one to understand the nature of substance. One must ask, what is its purpose?

To find the answer to this question, Aristotle must, of course, take his theories to their natural conclusion.[12] If all substances are the cause of matter, then there must be an imperishable substance made of pure actuality that has caused them. And this prime mover must have no potentiality in and of himself, for nothing could have caused Him. Rather, He must be the final cause, the teleological goal of all of creation, who caused the fixed stars to rotate and the planets to orbit around the earth. But how could he have caused this if he cannot change? Well, it is rather said thusly: he is the object of desire, and this causes all things to be oriented towards him. He alone meditates on meditation, reflects on reflection, thinks of about thinking- he eternally considers being qua being. So then, for our purposes, we are left with the conclusion that substance, in so far as it is caused by the Prime Mover, is actually the part of a composite which pushes it towards this teleological goal, the very good itself.

This, then, Aristotle says is the point of metaphysics: the systematic study of the primary origin and Material, Formal, Efficient, and especially the Final primary origins of species of definable genera. It is worthwhile to view Aristotle’s understanding of these things because they not only present a worthwhile, edifying system of their own, but also offer a very interesting (and, dare I say, convincing?) alternative to Plato’s metaphysical understanding of external forms.

[1] See Arthur F. Holmes, “Plato (conclusions) and Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” episode 09 in his Lecture Series History of Philosophy. Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL, April 7, 2015.

[2] Aristotle, The Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred, (Penguin Books: London, 2004), pp. 3ff.

[3] Holmes, “Plato,” Lecture. Likewise, see Anthony Kenny’s A Brief History of Western Philosophy, (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1998), pp. 79-83.

[4]See Hugh Lawson-Tancred’s lengthy discussion on pages xxvii-xxxix of Aristotle, Metaphysics.

[5] Ibid, 111 ff. All of the following definitions in the section come from this work.

[6] For a very elementary discussion of the four causes, see Andrew Davison’s The Love of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy for Theologians, (SCM Press: London, 2013), pp. 40-48. See also Jonathan Barne’s discussion of causes in Aristotelian thought in his book Aristotle, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1982), 51-56.

[7] Aristotle, Metaphysics, 165 ff.

[8] This insight belongs to Arthur F. Homes, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics I,” episode 10 in his Lecture Series History of Philosophy. Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL, April 7, 2015.

[9] Aristotle, Metaphysics, 231 ff.

[10] For a fairly good discussion of these terms, see Edwin Wallace’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1908), pp, 60-74. See also Davison, The Love of Wisdom, p. 40 ff.

[11] Aristotle, Metaphysics, 353.

[12] See Arthur F. Homes, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics II,” episode 11 in his Lecture Series History of Philosophy. Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL, April 7, 2015, for an enlightening explanation of this topic.