Many wonder about the future of the Middle East and whether or not the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a part of that future. This analysis attempts to answer this question in full using a variety of sources and concludes that ISIS is in fact not here to stay. This week, the first part of this analysis will focus on the bureaucratic and economic challenges in order to provide a general understanding of the Islamic State and the constraints it faces as it attempts to govern its territories. The second part, which will be released next week, will then go into further depth in regards to the military pressures confronting ISIS and how those pressures will eventually contribute to a regime breakdown, drawing parallels with the rise and fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Part I: A Troubled Future for the Islamic State

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has proved to be a resilient terrorist group, the likes of which the world has never before seen. However, the resilience of this group has been slowly eroding under a mountain of challenges, particularly those confronting its bureaucracy and economy.

To say that ISIS’ bureaucracy is weak would be inaccurate. Its political machinery shows a great deal of sophistication in its organization. The Islamic State, while lead by its Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is comprised of several councils. The Shura council hands down governance directives from Abu Bakr and the Sharia council deals with interpreting the Qur’an and Sunnah as per the hardline Salafism that characterizes the Islamic State’s ideology. Under these two councils, there are six smaller ones, with each being headed by a deputy of the Caliph. These councils administer to certain areas of governance such as the military, religious affairs, the media, and provinces. Their bureaucracy has also displayed a capacity to invest in public works, as these militants provide services such as road maintenance, postal services, and even a welfare service that is based on the Islamic principle of Zakat (almsgiving). Thus, ISIS’ bureaucracy has shown to have had quite a bit of thought and planning put into both the larger state apparatus and smaller organs of its more localized bureaucracy.

There is a great potential for competent governance, yet this potential is hindered by serious obstacles, most notably the multi-faceted anti-ISIS coalition. While the anti-ISIS coalition certainly affects the state apparatus by picking off leaders and targeting the state apparatus' compounds in Raqqa and Mosul, it also does some serious damage to the smaller bureaucratic organs by restricting their ability deliver goods and services. What good is having an office of electricity if that office struggles to provide sustained power to it citizens? Under ISIS' rule, the accessibility to both water and electricity has seriously deteriorated. In Mosul, inhabitants only get two hours of electricity a day, and each neighborhood has their water tanks filled up only once a week at varying times. Coupled with the fear of coalition airstrikes as well as a fear of the militants themselves, many are defying the Islamic State's ban on leaving. This level of hardship is simply not sustainable, and the exodus of their cities’ inhabitants is resulting in a brain drain of teachers and medical professionals, which testifies to ISIS' deteriorating ability to govern. There is no substitute for teachers and doctors and the well educated, and this brain drain reduces the overall effectiveness of the government in both administration and the quality of services that it struggles to provide.

Another problem that ISIS faces is the number of high-ranking leaders that are being killed by coalition airstrikes. An example of this would be how in January 2016, Assi Ali Mohammed Nasser al-Obeidi (Abu Bakr's second in command) was killed in Western Iraq. The thinning of the leadership's ranks puts further pressure on both the state apparatus itself as well as stability of the bureaucracy, These may of these high ranking leaders had valuable experience working for Saddam Hussein before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The loss of these important leaders serves to further degrade ISIS’ leadership and bureaucracy.

A struggling bureaucracy that is progressively being weakened by a brain drain and airstrikes highlights ISIS’ abysmal prospects for its future survival and sustainability. Here, we see the bureaucracy being squeezed by its surrounding circumstances, and eventually, this pressure will lead to fatigue and the eventual crumbling of bureaucratic services.

The economic constraints that ISIS faces have become all too apparent in the recent months. ISIS has cut the salaries of its fighters guarding Raqqa by 50 percent while still paying its foreign fighters double, causing discontent among the ranks. While the recent slash in salaries is perhaps not the most serious of misfortunes to befall the Islamic State, it serves as a symptom of ISIS’ much more serious economic malaise. Since mid-2015, the Islamic State’s revenue has dropped by 30 percent, going from $80 million a month to $56 million a month. ISIS gets 43 percent of its revenue from oil, and the coalition airstrikes have reduced the barrels of oil being produced from 33,000 barrels per day to 21,000 barrels a day. Taxation makes up 50 percent of the Islamic State’s revenue, and as the oil revenue decreases ISIS comes to rely more heavily on taxing its citizens. However, its recent battlefield setbacks have resulted in ISIS currently ruling 6 million people instead of the 9 million that it ruled in the past. A loss of 3 million people has put a significant dent in the pool from which the Islamic State draws its taxes. This economic pressure has resulted in ISIS levying higher taxes on its current citizens, as well as the imposition of fines for things such as not answering questions on the Qur’an correctly. ISIS is attaching fees to basic services and taxes its already impoverished citizens quite heavily as it struggles to stop itself from hemorrhaging money. Furthermore, the prices of basic things such as water and electricity have skyrocketed in addition to being poorly supplied. Even though there is a market full of goods in Raqqa, the price of food has shot up 1,000 percent making it only affordable for the jihadists. Fuel has also increased from 450 dinars to 2,000-2,500 dinars, which is particularly important during the winter months. Unemployment is also staggeringly high, further inhibiting ISIS’ ability to tax its population. The soaring prices of utilities, food, and fuel all indicate that ISIS is feeling the pain of the coalition’s anti-ISIS strategy, and calls into question the Caliphate’s ability to sustain itself economically. While ISIS is still alive and kicking, these economic blows have some serious ramifications for its future survival, and will almost certainly lead to a regime breakdown, as the citizens it presides over will become increasingly agitated and its underpaid fighters become increasingly disillusioned with the Islamic State.

While ISIS is still alive and kicking, these economic blows have some serious ramifications for its future survival, and will almost certainly lead to a regime breakdown, as the citizens it presides over will become increasingly agitated and its underpaid fighters become more disillusioned with the Islamic State.