Between 1945 and 1991, American history was dominated by one single overarching theme – rivalry with Soviet Russia. The origins, development, and eventual resolution of this epic geopolitical saga are the subject of Melvyn Leffler’s acclaimed history, “For the Soul of Mankind.”
Leffler, a professor in the University of Virginia’s Corcoran Department of History, is a renowned scholar of Cold War events, and winner of the Bancroft Prize for his book on the Truman administration, “A Preponderance of Power.” In his most recent work, Leffler offers a more comprehensive view of the Cold War accessible to general readers as well as trained historians.
Leffler views the cold war as arguably preventable. Both sides were driven by deep, sometimes exaggerated fears. After the end of the Second World War, Stalin feared the rise of a rejuvenated Germany and worried over encirclement by capitalist nations, whom he insisted were bent on his destruction. Likewise, the Truman administration – and most of its successors – believed that the Soviet Union was set on world domination, viewing left-wing movements in the third world as covert Soviet threats – even when they were not connected with the Kremlin. The deeply suspicious – and in Stalin’s case, outright paranoid – mentalities of both governments led inevitably to intense geopolitical rivalries.
Focusing heavily on personality, Leffler traces the tortured path of Soviet American relations from Eisenhower and Malenkov, to Kennedy and Khrushchev, to Carter and Brezhnev and beyond. Both sides at times sought compromise; Khrushchev relaxed internal controls and sought to establish a rapport with Kennedy, while Carter vainly strove to maintain the fragile existence of détente. Yet, as Leffler demonstrates, both America and the Soviets were constrained by ideology – Communist orthodoxy prevented Russia from dealing to closely with capitalists, while pressure from hardline anti-Communists hampered American efforts at negotiation. Likewise, peace was inhibited by both nations’ entanglement in regional wars – the U.S. in Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and both nations (indirectly) in the horn of Africa and Central America.
Two men – Gorbachev and Reagan – succeeded in bringing an end to the Cold War. Reagan, despite his fierce anti-Communism and minimal knowledge of policy, possessed a willingness to negotiate and set of keen social skills that allowed him to build an unprecedented relationship with his counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev. Rejecting the advice of figures like Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, who was skeptical of any attempt at talks, Reagan and his Secretary of State George Shultz worked to ease Cold War tensions by pursuing issues such as nuclear disarmament. Gorbachev, meanwhile, revolutionized his nation’s diplomacy by suggesting that Communism and capitalism could co-exist – a belief that inspired his reduction of the Russian military complex, lenient attitude towards satellite states, and rejection of foreign adventurism in favor of internal reform.
Overall, Leffler’s work is a highly readable and deeply penetrating analysis of one of history’s most important conflicts. For students of foreign policy, this book is likely an essential read.
